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THE RULE OF LAW UNPLUGGED†
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ABSTRACT
The “Rule of Law” is a venerable concept, but, on closer inspection, it is a
complex admixture of positive assumptions, inchoate political and legal theory,
and occasionally wishful thinking. Although enormous investments have been
made in rule of law reformism throughout the world, advocates of
transplanting American-style legal and political institutions to developed and
developing countries are often unclear about what they are transplanting and
why they are doing so. The concept of rule of law has become unplugged from
theories of law. Scholars clearly have more work to do in understanding the
rule of law and designing institutions to realize the objectives for which this
grand project is intended.
In this Article, we revisit the concept of the rule of law in order to unpack
the theoretical and operational assumptions underlying scholarship and
reform efforts. We do so from the perspective of legal and positive political
theory, and we interrogate various institutional devices (such as
constitutionalism and the independent judiciary) in order to shed light on how
the construct of the rule of law is being put into service on behalf of crossnational reform initiatives.
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INTRODUCTION
The rule of law maintains enormous appeal among scholars and reformers.1
Influential non-governmental organizations, supported generously by public
and private benefactors, have urged various nations to undertake institutional
and legal reforms in order to implement the rule of law.2 These myriad
reformers hope to create, maintain, and improve legal and political institutions
around the world.3 While their advocacy is resolutely normative, reformers
maintain that their prescriptions are supported by scholarly research
demonstrating that the establishment and maintenance of appropriate legal and
political institutions improves aggregate well-being.
Reformers, and many scholars, insist that the rule of law (which we will, on
occasion, refer to simply as “RL”) is an unalloyed good, promoting and
safeguarding values that are intrinsically desirable, such as economic
development and social progress.4 Political and legal theorists identify the rule
of law as essential to a justice-seeking polity. This connection is frequently

1 “The degree of apparent international consensus,” writes Thomas Carothers, “on the value and
importance of the rule of law is striking.” Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 4 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) (“The concept is suddenly
everywhere—a venerable part of Western political philosophy enjoying a new run as a rising imperative of the
era of globalization.”); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008)
(describing the rule of law as “one of the most important political ideals of our time”).
2 See infra Part I.
3 In addition to the various efforts by non-governmental organizations described infra Part I, two
initiatives—rule-of-law programs run by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Hague
Institute for the Internationalisation of Law—are especially noteworthy for their diligence in bringing together
a vast number of internationally recognized scholars, governmental officials, and private sector leaders to
discuss the rule of law and rule-of-law initiatives. See Democracy & the Rule of Law, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INT’L PEACE, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/global/index.cfm?fa=proj&id=101 (last
visited June 4, 2010); Rule of Law, Background and Overview, HAGUE INST. FOR THE INTERNATIONALISATION
OF LAW (HiiL), http://www.hiil.org/research/main-themes/rule-of-law/ (last visited June 4, 2010).
4 See, for example, two oft-quoted statements, the first by Nelson Mandela:

At its most basic, the rule of law has been held to mean simply that the government is required to
act in accordance with valid law. While this is undoubtedly desirable, it is not an exhaustive
description of the characteristics of a system that meets the criteria of the rule of law. Various
other wider definitions have been proposed. These have included the requirement of procedural
justice; something which is now generally recognized as part of the rule of law.
HAGUE INST. FOR THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW, EXTENSIVE REPORT ON THE FIRST HIIL LAW OF THE
FUTURE CONFERENCE 17 (2007) [hereinafter HAGUE INST.]. The second frequently quoted statement comes
from the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “[I]t is essential, if man is not to be compelled to
have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be
protected by the rule of law.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, pmbl., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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seen as grounded in democracy,5 human freedom,6 equality,7 justice,8
economic well-being,9 national identity,10 or, as with Lon Fuller, in the “inner
morality” of law.11 In the oft-stated dichotomy, a polity must be ruled by law
or else by men.12 It is said that where the rule of law is absent, we cannot
govern the governors, and thus we are subject to official prerogative, which
may be arbitrary, capricious, and brutal.13

5 See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS XXXVI, at
13 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE RULE OF LAW]; see also GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF
LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1988); Roberto Gargarella, The Majoritarian Reading
of the Rule of Law, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 149 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski
eds., 2003).
6 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 4–
11 (2003) (“The rule of law is therefore inherently a classical liberal concept that presupposes the need and
desirability to constrain governmental actors and maximize the sphere of liberty for private
ordering . . . .”); see also F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE POLITICAL
IDEAL OF THE RULE OF LAW (1955); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
7 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235–43 (1971). Stephen Holmes describes equality
before the law in the sense conceived by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The Social Contract as one of the
“lineages” of the rule of law. See Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law, in DEMOCRACY AND THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 19, 22, 47–53.
8 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Global Justice 14–15 (July 5, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Emory Law Journal), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20080806034945_large.pdf; see
also AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009).
9 See, e.g., Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic Development, 11 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 205 (2008); Philip Keefer, A Review of the Political Economy of Governance: From Property Rights to
Voice (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3315, 2004); Stephen Knack, Governance and
Growth (World Bank Working Paper, 2006) (on file with author).
10 See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1499–1503 (1988); see also Papachristou
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (“The rule of law . . . is the great mucilage that holds society
together.”).
11 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); see also infra text accompanying notes
52–62.
12 For famous statements of this dichotomy, see, for example, MASS. CONST. art. XXX (“[T]o the end it
may be a government of laws and not of men.”); JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND
A SYSTEM OF POLITICS 8 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1656) (“[G]overnment . . . is the
empire of laws and not of men.”); and DAVID HUME, ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 94 (Eugene
F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1987) (1777) (“It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was
formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government of Laws, not of Men.”). The best surmise
is that the phrase originates with Aristotle in The Politics. See infra notes 39, 45 and accompanying text; see
also W. Burnett Harvey, The Rule of Law in Historical Perspective, 59 MICH. L. REV. 487 (1961). Professor
Hampton has discussed this famous dichotomy in the context of Thomas Hobbes and his perspective on the
incompatibility between government and the rule of law. See Hampton, supra note 5.
13 For an interesting discussion of the political theory underlying this anxiety, see Michael P. Zuckert,
Hobbes, Locke, and the Problem of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 63–78. See also
Hampton, supra note 5; cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006) (providing that reviewing
courts shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary [or] capricious”).
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Yet the deeper we dig into the concept of the rule of law, the more vexing
the question becomes: What precisely does it entail, and how it should be
operationalized? The rule of law is, as one commentator puts it, “a much
celebrated, historic ideal, the precise meaning of which may be less clear today
than ever before.”14 Rule of law is an attractive ideal, but its attractiveness
may stem mainly from its imprecision, which allows each of us to project our
own sense of the ideal government onto the phrase “rule of law.” In the name
of the rule of law, we export American-style institutions across the globe
without sufficient evidence that these institutions are ideal for the United
States, let alone the rest of the world.15 Myriad incomplete and unsupported
assumptions underlie the claims made by the institutions associated with the
rule of law. Articulating a clearer conception of the rule of law and devising a
strategy for its implementation requires careful attention to these assumptions.
Our principal claims in this Article are four-fold. First, any sound
definition of the rule of law must explicitly incorporate substantive values.
While it may be framed in procedural terms (for instance, the idea that laws
should be transparent and prospective), any theory of the rule of law must
connect procedural rules with the values that the legal system aims to subserve.
Relatedly, RL’s advocates must have a theory of law squarely in their minds;
yoking rule of law to law’s ideals is incoherent without a framework for
understanding law’s purposes and its nature. Second, we must be able to
assess and measure the rule of law. Such measurement must go beyond simply
pointing to a series of institutions and assessing or indexing a system’s fidelity
to the rule of law by reference to these institutions.16 Rather, we must have in
mind a connection between the structure and performance of these institutions
14 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 11, 11 (1997); see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 11 (1996)
(“[L]egality and the ‘rule of law’ are ideals that present themselves as opaque even to legal philosophers.”);
Frank Lovett, A Positivist Account of the Rule of Law, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41, 41 (2002) (“[D]escriptive
accounts of the Rule of Law remain strikingly vague and imprecise.”); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the
Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 781 (1989) (noting that the RL ideal “is deeply contested” and that we lack
a “canonical formulation of its meaning”).
15 See, e.g., Stephen Golub, A House Without a Foundation, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW, supra at
105; Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW, supra at 75.
16 This protocol reminds us of the variegated ways in which colleges and universities manipulate their
data to improve their U.S. News & World Report rankings. Much like this, countries will strive, unfortunately,
to manipulate their own rule-of-law rankings without affecting their rule of law in constructive ways. For
example, we see the oddity of late-night television commercials in the United States touting the Republic of
Georgia’s Global Economic Scoreboard. For the web version of the Georgian National Investment Agency’s
(GNIA) call for enhanced investment, see Invest in Georgia, GEORGIAN NAT’L INV. AGENCY,
http://www.investingeorgia.org/ (last visited June 4, 2010).
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and the realization of the rule of law, once effectively defined. Third, rule-oflaw reform must contemplate the relationship between means and ends. A
satisfactory understanding of this relationship requires positive theory and
empirical support, not merely normative leaps of faith or ipse dixit. Finally,
rule-of-law reformism must take adequate account of trade-offs, that is,
conflicts among institutions aiming to promote the rule of law.17
Our aims in this Article are both critical and constructive. They are critical
in that we methodically unpack the assumptions of the scholarly literature to
reveal the shortcomings described above. We do not see the rule of law as
inevitably flawed, as a vacuous Rorschach test upon which legal scholars and
reformers simply project their own views about the content and purpose of law.
Rather, we see the rule of law as expressing a worthy aspiration that rightly
finds voice in the hard work of good-intentioned activists. The essential
predicament in the current practice of rule-of-law reformism is that the concept
of the rule of law rests on unstated and under-explicated assumptions.
Our aims are constructive in that we identify perilous assumptions and find
a way to define the rule of law without them. Specifically, a clearly defined
concept of the rule of law requires three innovations: (1) it must more
conspicuously incorporate substantive values and theories; (2) it must
incorporate, or at least be plugged into, a coherent theory of law; and (3) it
must make more cogent connections between means and ends. This last
innovation will help guide those engaged in reform to evaluate trade-offs.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we consider how and why RL
reformers value the rule of law, first focusing on the developing effort to
export American-style RL abroad and, then, on how legal theorists conceive of
and attempt to operationalize RL. In Part II, we offer some general

17

Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins write that democratic institutions:
establish two key tradeoffs with respect to democratic outcomes. The first is between a political
system’s decisiveness and its resoluteness. The tradeoff that any country makes on this
dimension—between having the ability to change policy and having the ability to commit to
policy—depends heavily on the effective number of vetoes in the political system. Polities that
choose to locate at either extreme will be ungovernable. At one end, a polity that lacks
decisiveness will encounter gridlock and stalemate. At the other end, a polity that lacks
resoluteness will be threatened by a lack of stability. The second tradeoff . . . is between the
private- and public-regardedness of policy produced.

Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes, in
PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 21, 22–23 (Stephan Haggard & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2001)
(footnote omitted).
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observations about how best to think about the imperative of “measuring” RL.
In Part III, we turn to the specifics of RL institutions, looking at the essential
institutions and key governance structures that are viewed in the literature as
configuring RL. With the contours of RL in mind, we turn in Part IV to the
daunting task of “implementing” RL. It is from this close analysis of
implementation that we arrive at our ultimately skeptical conclusion that RL is
misunderstood in fundamental ways.
I. VALUING THE RULE OF LAW
A. Rule of Law Reformism: Ambitions, Strategies, and Assumptions
The rule of law has an active fan club. The enormous appeal of RL reform
efforts is reflected in the myriad activities and statements of key U.S. and
international public and private agencies, including the World Bank, the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, and the American Bar Association (ABA).
These organizations have spent enormous amounts of money on legal reform
efforts,18 and their efforts show little signs of slowing. The Global Governance
Group of the World Bank connects rule of law to its comprehensive effort to
improve worldwide governance.19 While policy analysts urge attention to
outcome measures and other indicators of governance,20 many of what are
conventionally described as outcome measures are in fact institutions that, in
the judgment of World Bank analysts, reflect and implement the rule of law.21

18 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE RULE OF LAW FUNDING WORLDWIDE FOR
FISCAL YEARS 1993–98, at 3 (1999) (noting that the U.S. government spent $970 million on rule of law
assistance); Carothers, supra note 1, at 10 (“Assistance in [the RL] field has mushroomed in recent years,
becoming a major category of international aid.”). In 2005, the United States dedicated nearly $500 million
for RL assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq alone. Lydia Brashear Tiede, The Rule of Law: What Is It? Can We
Measure It? Do We Have It? 7 n.8 (Oct. 27, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Emory Law
Journal), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=906157.
19 See WBI GOVERNANCE & ANTI-CORRUPTION, http://www.worldbank.org/wbl/governance/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2010); see also Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the
Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999); Upham, supra note 15, at 77–79 (describing the World
Bank model of RL).
20 See Governance Matters 2009: Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996–2008, WORLD BANK GROUP,
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (last visited June 4, 2010); see also Daniel Kaufmann et al.,
Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper
No. 3106, 2003).
21 See, e.g., Messick, supra note 19, at 117–36; John Hewko, Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule
of Law Matter? (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Working Paper No. 26, 2002). In a recent paper,
Sebastian Saiegh summarizes this line of scholarship:
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Likewise, USAID maintains that the rule of law is a principle of universal
appeal, noting that “[t]he term ‘rule of law’ is used frequently in reference to a
wide variety of desired end states. . . . However, the term usually refers to a
state in which citizens, corporations and the state itself obey the law, and the
laws are derived from a democratic consensus.”22 USAID references two
notable descriptions of the rule of law; one describes the rule of law as
“protecting fundamental political, social, and economic rights,”23 and the other,
which comes from the United Nations, provides that: “The rule of
law . . . refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions
and entities . . . are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with
international human rights norms and standards.”24
The World Justice Project seeks to “1) advance the understanding of the
processes that lead to and impede the development of the rule of law in
different national contexts, and 2) advance the understanding of the
contributions that the rule of law can make to reducing poverty, violence, and
corruption and increasing education and health.”25 One of the most farreaching RL programs is the Rule of Law Initiative of the ABA,26 but the ABA

In the past two decades, a number of scholars have turned to non-economic factors to explain
variations in wealth across countries. Economic theory suggests institutions impact decisions
about labor supply, saving, investment, and exchange. According to the institutionalist view,
laws and regulations that enforce contracts, guarantee property rights and promote welldeveloped financial markets can foster economic growth by encouraging investment in human
and physical capital, as well as the development of technological innovations.
Sebastian M. Saleigh, Political Institutions and Sovereign Borrowing: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century
Argentina 1 (Nov. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Emory Law Journal), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434534.
22 USAID, GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS: THE RULE OF LAW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 5
(2008).
23 Id.
24 U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, 4, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
25 Robert L. Nelson & Lee Cabatingan, Introductory Essay: New Research on the Rule of Law 1 (Jul. 5,
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Emory Law Journal), available at http://www.lexisnexis.
com/documents/pdf/20080806010147_large.pdf.
26 See About the ABA Rule of Law Initiative, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/rol/about.shtml (last
visited Mar. 1, 2010). In a similar vein, the International Bar Association has adopted a Rule of Law
Resolution declaring the following: “An independent, impartial judiciary; the presumption of innocence; the
right to a fair and public trial without undue delay; a rational and proportionate approach to punishment; a
strong and independent legal profession; strict protection of confidential communications between lawyer and
client; equality of all before the law; these are all fundamental principles of the Rule of Law.” HAGUE INST.,
supra note 4, at 17 n.7.
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largely elides the question of what RL is and instead has developed a multipronged, multinational set of programs to improve the well-being of
underperforming countries.27 They concentrate their efforts around the
following imperatives: judicial reform, legal profession reform, prosecutorial
reform, legal education reform, combating human trafficking, the development
of an index based on the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the development of an assessment tool based on the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women.28
What the World Justice Project and the ABA do, in essence, is commission
scholarship, craft “white papers” of various sorts, send staff and consultants
around the country and around the world to make presentations, and, in various
ways, engage with public officials and private citizens in many countries to
fashion institutions and governance structures that ostensibly promote RL.
Much of the back-office work involves the development of assessment tools
and outcome measures. These measures describe in a fair amount of detail the
criteria of good governance,29 including not only institutional architecture but
also basic governmental structure (for instance, “Is the system democratic?”),30
and the content of legal rules (for instance, “Are there secure property
rights?”).31 Each of these organizations, especially the World Bank and
USAID,32 have collected an ample supply of serious scholarly analyses that
27

On its Rule of Law Initiative home page, the American Bar Association (ABA) claims that “over half
of the world’s population lives in countries that lack the rule of law, consigning billions of people to lives
characterized by a lack of economic opportunity, basic justice and even physical security.” About the ABA
Rule of Law Initiative, supra note 26.
28 See id. For a comprehensive collection of publications concerning the ABA’s Rule of Law Initiative,
see ABA Rule of Law Initiative: Publications and Assessments, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/rol/
publications.shtml (last visited June 5, 2010).
29 For a comprehensive review, see Haggard et al., supra note 9. See also Daron Acemoglu et al., The
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001);
Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of an
Institutional Explanation, 35 ECON. INQUIRY 590 (1997); Knack, supra note 9; Stephen Knack & Philip
Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional
Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207 (1995); Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Political Regimes and
Economic Growth, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 51 (1993).
30 On democracy and governance, see Robert J. Barro, Democracy and Growth, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 1
(1996) and John F. Helliwell, Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth, 24 BRIT. J.
POL. SCI. 225 (1994).
31 On property rights and governance in particular, see Keefer, supra note 9. The classic analysis in this
area is HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1989). See also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF
CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
32 The websites for both organizations contain helpful links to publications and working papers on
various aspects of their respective projects. See Democracy & Governance: Rule of Law, USAID,
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purport to measure the state and scope of RL and “governance” in individual
countries and worldwide as well as the progress of RL reform efforts.33
Four key assumptions underlie this RL reformism. First, RL reformers
believe that RL captures something of universal applicability.34 The rule of
law is of cross-national, cross-cultural value; each political system, whatever
its cultural underpinnings and objectives, ought to incorporate RL values and
institutions into its legal system.35 The claim, reduced to its basics, is that a
political system can only achieve economic self-sufficiency and consistent
quality if it constructs and maintains legal institutions. Societies lacking these
institutions may be described as having law, but we cannot sensibly describe
them as having the rule of law, at least in any sense that would keep RL
coherent as a concept. Second, RL reformism insists that the structure of RL is
not merely made up of a commitment to legal obedience and the cluster of
values that define the concept of RL, but is also composed of a distinctive
series of institutions and governance arrangements. Reformers assume that a
legal system’s commitment to RL is by resort to these institutions and
arrangements. Third, RL is associated with democracy and is thus regarded as
being in tension with authoritarianism or any kind of top-down legal system in
which the people do not ultimately rule.36 Whether or not an authoritarian
legal system is properly deemed a legal system, this system does not and
cannot, in the eyes of RL reformers, embody RL. Lastly, RL reformers insist
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/rule_of_law/ (last visited June 5,
2010); Governance Matters 2009, supra note 20.
33 For sophisticated critiques of these governance measures, see Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J.
ECON. 453 (2003); Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445–70 (2004);
and Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999).
34 “Universal theories,” writes Professor Upham, “of the interdependence of legal form and economic
activity lurk behind the rhetoric of the rule of law without a great deal of intellectual agonizing over exactly
what this form of law entails, how it relates to economic activity, or how it fits in different political, social, and
institutional contexts.” Upham, supra note 15, at 76.
35 See HAGUE INST., supra note 4, at 23–30 (2007) (describing the objective as creating a “rule of law
marketplace”). But see Carothers, supra note 1, at 5 (contrasting the American view with RL as understood in
“Asian-style democracy”). For another contrary view, see Matthew Stephenson, A Trojan Horse in China?, in
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW, supra at 191, 197 (“It is generally agreed . . . that the U.S. and Chinese
governments have different things in mind when they talk about the rule of law.”).
36 As Thomas Carothers, the impresario of the Carnegie Endowment’s rule of law project, puts it:
The relationship between the rule of law and liberal democracy is profound. The rule of law
makes possible individual rights, which are at the core of democracy. A government’s respect
for the sovereign authority of the people and a constitution depends on its acceptance of law.
Democracy includes institutions and processes that, although beyond the immediate domain of
the legal system, are rooted in it.
Carothers, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 4–5; see also Hampton, supra note 5.
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that RL can be measured. The assumption here, though generally unstated, is
that RL is a single-dimensional concept, much the same as a Likert scale,37 and
thus one that can be measured with reasonable precision and without attention
to tradeoffs and other considerations that are characteristic of multidimensional
concepts.
B. Rule of Law and Legal Theory
Theorists since Aristotle38 have been primarily interested in fashioning a
coherent description of RL that can withstand analytic scrutiny.39 Nonetheless,
there are those who believe this to be a fool’s errand—that the rule of law is an
“essentially contested concept.”40 We might wonder, then, before setting off to
change the world, whether and to what extent we have made any progress in
defining rule of law. Constitutional theorist Richard Fallon notes that “[t]he
Rule of Law might appear, at best, to be no more than an honorific title for an
amalgam of the values, and the preferred means for promoting those values,
reflected in the competing Rule-of-Law ideal types.”41 Thomas Hobbes
concluded that nothing like RL was really possible42 because the government is
typically disinclined to tie itself to the mast of legal rules, thereby ensuring that
that the rule of law was applicable to governed and governor alike. On one
reading, therefore, RL is not a useful analytical concept at all.43
37 The Likert scale refers to a psychometric scale used in survey research to aggregate respondent
opinions by specifying their level of agreement to a particular statement. Responses are generally ranked from
“strongly approve” to “strongly disapprove.” See Rensis Likert, A Technique for the Measurement of
Attitudes, 22 ARCHIVES PSYCHOL. 1 (1932). For a thorough analysis of the Likert scale and other mechanisms
of social scientific measurement, see LAWRENCE S. MEYERS ET AL., APPLIED MULTIVARIATE RESEARCH:
DESIGN AND INTERPRETATION (2005).
38 Aristotle, The Politics, reprinted in ARISTOTLE: THE POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 88
(Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, rev. student ed. 1996) (“[H]e who bids the law rule may be
deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is
a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men.”). For an
interesting exploration of the different strands, though not necessarily contradictions, in Aristotle’s thoughts on
RL, see Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 LAW & PHIL.
137, 141–42 (2002).
39 See infra text accompanying notes 48–92.
40 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 14, at 791 (describing the rule of law as a deeply contested concept); see
also Waldron, supra note 38, at 148–53 (unpacking “[e]ssentially [c]ontested [c]oncepts”).
41 Fallon, supra note 14, at 41.
42 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 176–77 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651) (“[H]e
that is bound to himself only, is not bound.”). See generally Hampton, supra note 5 (discussing Hobbes’s
views on rule of law). See also Zuckert, supra note 13, at 63–67.
43 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561
(1977) (reviewing DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY ENGLAND (1975) and E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT
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More commonly, scholars argue that RL encapsulates the heady notion that
law should govern human affairs with quality and attention to the virtues and
values that make up a good legal system and, moreover, that the governors
should be governed by law.44 Political and legal theorists typically frame the
concept of the rule of law around a series of qualities of “good law.” These
basic qualities might be broad and even opaque (as in Aristotle’s declaration
that “[t]he law is reason unaffected by desire”),45 or they may drill deeper into
the structure of the legal system in promulgating particular rules of the road (as
in the insistence on prospective, rather than retrospective, legal rules).46 But
the framework as it has been revisited and refined over the centuries highlights
the fundamental and normative point that a good legal system is effective only
insofar as individuals and officials are ruled by law, not men. Under the RL
framework, men carry out their responsibilities and duties in accordance with
agreed-upon principles, principles that make up the contours of RL. “In a
fundamentally just society,” writes Ronald Cass, “the rule of law serves to
channel decision making in attractive ways, to make decisions more
predictable, and to increase the prospects for fair administration of public
power.”47
Rule of law scholars have attempted to draw a coherent connection
between the qualities of good law and the objectives that certain lawmaking
principles and legal institutions are intended to achieve. For A.V. Dicey, the
Oxford scholar credited with coining the phrase, the principal objective of RL
is to discipline and regulate official power.48 Dicey described RL as entailing
three basic requirements49: First, the supremacy of law over arbitrary power
(the rule of law, not men, is the slogan generally associated with this influential

(1975)); Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW:
IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY? 97 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
44 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 1–4 (2001); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270 (1980); RAWLS, supra note 7, at 236–39; Andrei Marmor, The Ideal of the Rule of
Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 666, 666 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed.
2010) (“The ideal of the rule of law is basically the moral–political ideal that it is good to be ruled by law.”).
45 Aristotle, supra note 38, at 88.
46 See infra text accompanying note 57.
47 CASS, supra note 44, at xi.
48 See generally A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 183–205
(10th ed. 1959) (equating the rule of law with “the security given under the English constitution to the rights of
individuals”). For an interesting take on Professor Dicey in his historical context, see MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 225–27 (1992).
49 See generally DICEY, supra note 48, at 181–205.
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concept); second, equality before the law of all, including government
officials; and, third, constitutional law as fundamental law.50
The focus in the literature on official infidelity raises the puzzle of why
exactly we value RL.51 The most famous answer in modern jurisprudence is
provided by Lon Fuller. His list of RL virtues captures well the overall
objective of RL as a matter of legal theory and, as well, delineates qualities of
good law that command widespread agreement.52 Fuller views RL as entailing
a series of moral qualities that are characteristic of good law.53 These include
the requirements of54:
•

Generality, so that expectations of conduct are stated in rules widely
applicable and impartially applied;55

50 Friedrich Hayek was even more insistent that RL was fundamentally concerned with restricting
governmental power. “[F]ormal equality before the law,” writes Hayek, “is in conflict . . . with any activity of
the government deliberately aiming at material or substantive equality of different people, and . . . any policy
aiming directly at a substantive ideal of distributive justice must lead to the destruction of the Rule of Law.”
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 82. Political theorist Michael Oakeshott also drew a
connection between the RL ideal and individual liberty. See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, The Rule of Law, in ON
HISTORY: AND OTHER ESSAYS 119 (1983). As one recent commentator summarized, Oakeshott saw the rule
of law as “an inherent part of a free, peaceful, and prosperous society,” and, therefore, “[a] society organized
under the rule of law is a ‘liberal’ order of private ordering and constitutional limits on government;
[correlatively], the rule of law can exist only in such an order.” Zywicki, supra note 6, at 6.
51 Judith Shklar, presumably having in mind these political theory efforts to explain why RL is essential,
was quite skeptical of the connection, writing that “contemporary theories [of the rule of law] fail because they
have lost a sense of what the political objectives of the ideal of the Rule of Law originally were and have come
up with no plausible restatement.” Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF
LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY?, supra note 43, at 1, 1. Hence, the phrase “has become meaningless thanks to
ideological abuse and general over-use.” Id.; see also Upham, supra note 15, at 75.
52 Because it is not relevant to this analysis, we elide the question of whether Fuller was or was not a
legal positivist and, therefore, whether he saw the rule of law as a prerequisite to fidelity and obedience to
ascriptive law. The classic texts on this issue are H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) and Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). See also Gerald J. Postema, Positivism and the Separation of Realists
from Their Skepticism: Normative Guidance, the Rule of Law, and Legal Reasoning, in THE HART–FULLER
DEBATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, at 259, 281 (Peter Cane ed., 2010); Frederick Schauer, Is Defeasibility an
Essential Property of Law?, in ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni B. Ratti eds.,
forthcoming 2010).
53 See, e.g., Colleen Murphy, Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law, 24 LAW & PHIL. 239,
241 (2005) (“[These criteria] specify necessary conditions for the activities of lawmakers to count as
lawmaking.”).
54 These requirements are taken from Chapter 2 of Fuller’s The Morality of Law. FULLER, supra note 11,
at 46–91.
55 Id. at 46–49. Fuller associates this requirement with the need for neutrality in legal decision making,
and he notes as an instance of the failure of generality the presence and prevalence of special laws. See id. at
47 n.4.
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Publicity, so that legal decision makers make available to the public
the rules to be observed;56
Prospectivity, so that no one will be subject to the “threat of
retrospective change”;57
Understandability, or what has also been called clarity;58
Consistency, so that no one is subject to contradictory rules;59
Possibility, that is, the prohibition of “rules that require conduct
beyond the powers of the affected party”;60
Stability, so that rules do not change so frequently that parties cannot
adequately gauge their actions and inactions;61 and
Congruence between the stated rules and their actual administration.62

Joseph Raz’s depiction of RL is broadly congruent with Fuller’s famous
list.63 Raz emphasizes prospectivity, transparency, clarity, and stability, all of
which are on Fuller’s list, but he adds generality, expressed as the imperative
of “general rules.” He goes on to say that “the requirement of generality is of
the essence of the rule of law.”64 Raz supplements the Fullerian RL criteria by
addressing specific institutional dimensions of RL. He adds to the list the
requirement of an independent judiciary and judicial review;65 and he further
urges that “the discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should not be
allowed to prevent the law.”66 Raz acknowledges that this latter category of
RL principles addresses different dimensions of RL. The first set of principles,
largely congruent with Fuller’s, reflect the requirement “that the law should
conform to standards designed to enable it effectively to guide action.”67 The
second institutionally salient set of principles is “designed to ensure that the

56

The somewhat clumsy label Fuller gives this requirement is “promulgation.” See id. at 49–51.
Id. at 51–62.
58 Id. at 63–65. Fuller also notes that Hayek made a substantially similar point in The Road to Serfdom.
Id. at 64–65 (quoting HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 81).
59 Id. at 65–70.
60 Id. at 70–79.
61 Id. at 79–81.
62 Id. at 81–91.
63 JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 214–15 (1979). And,
indeed, so are the other influential theoretical treatments of RL’s characteristics. See Waldron, supra note 38,
at 155 (“Fuller, [John] Rawls, Raz, [Margaret] Radin, and [John] Finnis do not present themselves as
advocating rival conceptions. Their approaches seem quite congenial to each other; they are filling in the
details of what is more or less the same conception in slightly different ways.”).
64 Fuller, supra note 11, at 215.
65 Id. at 216–17.
66 Id. at 218.
67 Id.
57

MCRODGAST GALLEYSFINAL

1468

10/8/2010 11:11 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

legal machinery of enforcing the law . . . shall be capable of supervising
conformity to the rule of law and provide effective remedies in cases of
deviation from it.”68 The contemporary commentary on RL has worked
through themes that are quite copacetic with this normative template. As
Andrei Marmor recently noted, there is a “remarkable consensus” about what
RL basically entails.69 The theoretical scholarship on RL is broadly consistent
both with Dicey’s preoccupation with narrowing of official discretion and with
the Fuller–Raz focus on the qualities of a good legal system.
Other contemporary legal theorists have emphasized the point that RL
qualities are very important, perhaps even essential, to realize the myriad
objectives of good governance.70 However, we can still describe the issue of
RL’s values as unsettled because disagreement remains about which of these
RL characteristics are “essential,” which just facilitate law’s purposes and
objectives, and which ought to be reconsidered as perhaps only valued
contingently. Fuller provides us with a famous list, yet he does not purport to
describe a hierarchy of values or a way to make trade-offs when, as we discuss
later, these qualities conflict. Raz’s depiction of RL values comes somewhat
closer to making a comparative assessment among RL qualities, but he
understandably stops short of doing so. Nor does he concern himself with the
practical task of assembling RL values into an institutional matrix.71 To the
extent that we seek practical advice for reformers about how precisely to
implement RL values and how to construct and maintain legal institutions, the
lack of clarity about how to assess and rank these RL values is problematic.

68

Id.
Marmor, supra note 44.
70 See, e.g., Lovett, supra note 14, at 60 (“[I]f a political community has something recognizable as a
legal system, then it must be the case that Rule of Law principles are at least to some extent being observed.”).
This is one variation on Ronald Dworkin’s theme that proper legal rules have substantive objectives—
objectives of good law. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 413 (1991) (“That is, anyway, what law is for
us: for the people we want to be and the community we aim to have.”). In another plausible account, framed
most famously by H.L.A. Hart, rule-of-law values are consistent with alternative legal regimes; however, a
legal system’s efficacy is bound up in important ways with RL institutions and qualities. See H.L.A. HART,
Postscript, in THE CONCEPT OF LAW 238, 250–54 (2d ed. 1994). Similarly, Joseph Raz sees RL as “essentially
a negative value . . . . designed to minimize the danger created by the law itself.” See RAZ, supra note 63, at
224.
71 In his participation in the conference dialogue from which this paper’s ideas grew, Professor Raz made
it clear that he is rather agnostic as to the particular relationship between his theory of RL and the institutional
arrangements that may promote or undermine his conception of RL. However, he does discuss some of the
institutional implications of RL in Joseph Raz, The Politics of the Rule of Law, 3 RATIO JURIS 331 (1990),
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS
354 (1994).
69
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Moreover, to the extent that scholars are in fact thinking hard about
institutions, they are generally thinking about legal institutions—or, even more
opaquely, characteristics of decision making within the judiciary. By focusing
on the judiciary as the key institution responsible for implementing the rule of
law, scholars invariably ignore the reality that long-term stability of the law
requires not only establishing the right legal institutions, but also embedding
the legal system in the right way within the larger political system so that the
latter can sustain the former.72 After all, a serious inquiry into RL must
confront the basic fact that in countries in which legal and political institutions
are established through ambitious reform efforts, legal institutions fail more
often than they succeed.73 We will return to the political context of RL in a
later section. For now, we merely point out that the theoretical strand of RL
thinking—a body of work represented by the leading political and legal
scholars of our time—seldom draws the connection among the characteristics
of RL, the structure of legal institutions, and the political context in which RL
is nested.
A further disagreement—one that also threatens to imperil RL as a useful
construct for real political reform efforts—concerns whether RL values are
essentially proceduralist or whether they entail concrete substantive
commitments. Hayek’s famous formulation of RL helped sow confusion on
this matter. While he depicted RL as a set of articulated constraints on the
government’s coercive power, he saw RL as promoting, in its design and
implementation, individual freedom.74
Raz objected to this second
implication, noting that Hayek’s view of RL and human freedom “leads to
exaggerated expectations” of RL.75 Rule of law should be understood, argues
Raz, as a more modest enterprise; it is truly “just one of the virtues the law
should possess” and “possesses no more than prima facie force.”76 And,
although Fuller saw RL as intrinsic to the morality of law, the RL qualities he
listed are essentially proceduralist—they are congruent with many substantive

72 See generally Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245 (1997) [hereinafter Weingast, Political Foundations]; Barry R. Weingast, Why
Developing Countries Prove So Resistant to the Rule of Law (Stanford Ctr. for Int’l Dev., Working Paper No.
382, 2009), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/SCID382.pdf.
73 See Weingast, Political Foundations, supra note 72, and sources cited therein.
74 HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 88 (“[W]hatever form [the RL] takes, any such
recognised limitations of the powers of legislation imply the recognition of the inalienable right of the
individual, inviolable rights of man.”).
75 RAZ, supra note 63, at 226.
76 Id. at 228.
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commitments and, indeed, many different types of legal systems.77 This
proceduralist conception is hard to square with the discussion of RL in the
work of two other prominent modern theorists: John Rawls and Ronald
Dworkin. Rawls has been less engaged with the project of sketching the
political and legal architecture of RL, but he certainly had in mind the ideal of
RL as vouchsafing substantive equality and justice.78 The overarching value of
RL, then, would stand or fall on its ability to implement these aims; by
contrast, a purely proceduralist template would be unlikely to realize these
objectives. Ronald Dworkin is even more insistent that RL must embody
substantive equality commitments.79 “The connection,” says Dworkin, “is
sometimes expressed in the rubric that under the rule of law no man is above
the law; but the force of that claim . . . is not exhausted by the idea that each
law should be enforced against everyone according to its terms.”80 Rule-oflaw philosophers, he concludes, “have in mind substantial and not merely
formal equality before the law.”81 In an earlier iteration of his RL analysis,
Dworkin contrasted the “rule-book” conception of RL with a “rights”
conception in which RL “is the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception
of individual rights.”82 In this view, RL is irretrievably substantive. “It does
not distinguish,” writes Dworkin, “as the rule-book conception does, between
the rule of law and substantive justice; on the contrary it requires, as part of the
ideal of law, that the rules in the rule book capture and enforce rights.”83
As Jeremy Waldron has recently pointed out, however, this procedural–
substantive dichotomy is not a rigid one.84 “A procedural understanding of the
Rule of Law,” writes Waldron, does not just require “that officials apply the
rules as they are set out; it requires application of the rules with all the care and
attention to fairness that is signaled by ideals such as ‘natural justice’ and
‘procedural due process.’”85 Waldron shifts the focus from RL as merely, or
especially, a reformulation of the bromide that individuals and officials alike
must obey the law to focus on the substantive values of RL—at the very least,
77 See FULLER, supra note 11, at 153 (“[L]aw’s internal morality . . . is indifferent toward the substantive
aims of law and is ready to serve a variety of such aims with equal efficacy.”).
78 See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 206–13.
79 See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 177 (2006) (explaining that he “prefer[s] a conception of
legality” that promotes “substantial and not merely formal equality before the law”).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11–12 (1985).
83 Id. at 12.
84 See Waldron, supra note 1, at 7–8.
85 Id.
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the value of fairness and equitable administration of justice.86 For Waldron,
the procedural qualities are deeply connected to the objectives of legal decision
making.87 The conventional RL lists of these qualities, then, reiterate the
notion that fair procedure is a talisman for good law. Waldron is well aware of
the other values that good legal systems aim to promote, but he reshapes the
RL inquiry by pressing the point that RL can avoid the pitfall of becoming an
“essentially contested concept” if it is understood as a congeries of qualities
that are fundamentally proceduralist but no less utilitarian and purposive.88
We thus circle back to Dicey and Hayek to make the point that the view of
RL as a mechanism for restraining governmental power can also be understood
in substantive terms.89 To be sure, framing RL as limits on official discretion
leaves many opportunities for noxious legal content on the table.90 A rulebook
community may, after all, be a community of horrific laws.91 However, the
restraints on governmental power that RL in the Dicey–Hayek sense (a sense
that Hobbes thought quite unlikely to materialize)92 limits the threat that a
community would in fact create a substantively attractive legal system only to
discover that the implementation of this system is gutted by official mendacity
and abuses of discretion. The juxtaposition of rule of law and rule of men is
meant to capture, at the very least, the notion that society should have decent
confidence that their expressed desires will be accommodated and respected by
their representatives.
II. MEASURING THE RULE OF LAW
Rule-of-law reformers must not only try their best to develop and
implement legal institutions across the globe; they must also have in place
mechanisms of assessment and measurement. We need to know how and why
RL fails as well as how and why it succeeds. This requires a comprehensive
86

Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 55.
88 See Waldron, supra note 1, at 28–38 (describing RL’s virtues).
89 See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 7, at 19, 22 (discussing Rousseau’s view that a pluralistic society can
exercise its political leverage to maximize—if not achieve—political equality).
90 See Richard Flathman, Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political Institutionalization: The
Case of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 297, 301 (“[T]he idea of the rule of law speaks
primarily to the question of fidelity to law and leaves largely unresolved the issue of the proper scope and
content of legal regulation.”).
91 See HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 85 (“It may well be that Hitler has obtained his
unlimited powers in a strictly constitutional manner . . . . [b]ut who would suggest for that reason that the Rule
of Law still prevails in [Nazi] Germany?”).
92 See supra text accompanying note 42.
87
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series of measurement tools that will help reformers address in a clear-headed
way whether and to what extent certain RL initiatives are having their intended
effect. At the very least, these assessments help determine whether the effort is
worth the considerable investment. More fundamentally, we need to measure
RL to make educated judgments about how best to refine our objectives to
serve the large and important cause of improving governance and enhancing
societal well-being throughout the world.
There are serious questions about whether suitable measurement is
possible.93 Most importantly, we face the ubiquitous dilemma of determining
how best to make trade-offs where RL values come into conflict. In the
contemporary RL literature, the qualities of RL are seen as linear and as
basically pointing in the same direction. All good things, this literature
suggests, go together.94 Each institution and governance structure is viewed as
93 “Measures of the [RL] concept have proliferated over the past decade, yet scholars commonly question
their validity. We argue that measurement validity concerns are largely a function of the concept being
targeted. We suggest that the broad, multidimensional concept of the rule of law should not guide empirical
research, even if the individual concepts from which it is constituted should.” Julio Rios-Figueroa & Jeffrey
K. Staton, Unpacking the Rule of Law: A Review of Judicial Independence Measures 1 (April 26, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http:/ssrn.com/abstract=1434234.
94 According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank, we can see how
measures are presently created and used. The IFC states that its “Doing Business” project “publishes 8,967
indicators each year. To create these indicators, the team measures more than 52,000 data points, each of
which is made available on the Doing Business website.” See Doing Business: Measuring Business
Regulations, Data Notes, Data Challenges and Revisions, INT’L FIN. CORP., http://www.doingbusiness.org/
MethodologySurveys/MethodologyNote.aspx (last visited June 6, 2010). How exactly is this to be used to
explain outcomes in 185 countries, some of which change very little each year and others that change not at all
year to year? However these indicators are scaled, amalgamated, indexed, added, subtracted or multiplied, we
have many orders of magnitude greater numbers of explanatory variables than cases. We need only 184
explanatory variables, plus a few year dummies, to explain 100% of the times series on country-economic
growth. They create all of these nearly nine thousand measures for only 185 cases. For most of the measures
related to law, there are less than ten “contributors,” on average, contributing to the measures, and for many
countries far less than ten. The World Bank is explicitly drawing from and contributing to the current
academic literature in economics, as discussed on the methodology page of the Doing Business website.
Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations, INT’L FIN. CORP., http://www.doingbusiness.org/
MethodologySurveys/ (last visited June 6, 2010). Construction of these RL indexes goes far beyond a
recitation of laws and their reform. Rather, Doing Business asks contributors to fill out a survey, evaluating
the dynamics of a hypothetical scenario as follows:

Case Study Assumptions
Please read carefully the following assumptions to complete the rest of the survey.
Facts:
1. Buyer Co. (“Buyer”) is a food manufacturing company. It manufactures and distributes all of its
products itself.
2. Mr. James is Buyer’s controlling shareholder and a member of Buyer’s board of directors. He
owns 60% of Buyer and elected 2 directors to Buyer’s 5-member board of directors. If your
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a complement for another. We should, for instance, have an independent
judiciary and separation of powers; we should maintain a unitary-executive
scheme and also have clearly prescribed limits on executive discretion. Our
analysis above reveals a point that should be, if not obvious, fairly clear: These
schemes will frequently come into conflict with one another. That there are
country requires a supervisory board that is appointed at least in part by shareholders, assume that
Mr. James has elected 60% of the shareholder-elected members of the supervisory board. Assume
also that the 5-member board of directors then consists of 3 directors, including Mr. James himself,
who were designated or proposed by Mr. James’ members on the supervisory board.
3. Mr. James also owns 90% of Seller Co. (“Seller”), which operates a chain of retail hardware
stores. Seller is facing financial problems and recently shut a large number of its stores. As a
result, many of its trucks are not being used.
4. Mr. James proposes to Buyer that Buyer purchase Seller’s unused trucks to expand Buyer’s
distribution of its food products. Buyer agrees and enters into the transaction.
5. All required approvals are obtained and all mandatory disclosures are made. The final terms of
the transaction require Buyer to pay to Seller in cash an amount equal to 10% of Buyer’s assets in
exchange for the trucks. If Mr. James can lawfully vote on the transaction at Buyer’s board of
directors and/or shareholder level, please assume he is the deciding vote in favor of the transaction.
6. The price of the trucks is above market value and the transaction causes damages to Buyer.
Minority shareholders within Buyer sue Mr. James and the parties that approved the transaction.
7. Assume that Buyer is a large private firm (i.e., not state-owned) that has issued stock that is
publicly traded and is listed on your country’s most important stock exchange. If there is no stock
exchange in your country, or if there are fewer than 10 firms actively traded on your country’s
exchange, please assume that Buyer is a large private company with a large number of
shareholders.
8. Assume that the transaction is part of Buyer’s ordinary course of business.
9. The transaction is not ultra vires (i.e., is not outside the power or authority of Buyer).
10. If you make any further assumptions, please explain them clearly in your responses.
WORLD BANK GROUP, INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS: PROTECTING INVESTORS SURVEY—ECONOMY 4
(2010), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/Documents/Survey_Instruments/DB11_Protecting_
Investors_survey_en.pdf. Contributors are then asked a series of questions, such as:
What is the standard of proof for a civil claim (e.g., beyond reasonable doubt, preponderance of
the evidence, balance of probabilities)? . . . .
....
What is the standard of proof for a criminal claim (e.g., beyond reasonable doubt, intimate
conviction, preponderance of evidence)? . . . .
....
In the suit described above, what is the minimum the plaintiff must prove to hold Mr. James
liable? . . . .
....
Please assume that the transaction was duly approved and all disclosure requirements were
met. . . . If Buyer’s shareholders are successful in the action(s) against Mr. James described
above, describe what remedies are available.
Id. at 9–10. These are among the eighteen pages of questions that contributors are asked just about the topic of
protecting investors. Which theory of law tells us that a balance-of-probabilities standard for civil claims and
an intimate-conviction standard for criminal claims, plus the disposition of certain remedies trumps, or is
trumped by, other constellations of answers?
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conflicting values at stake in public policy making is not, in and of itself, an
arresting insight. But what makes this especially problematic in the context of
RL reformism is that we have no neat mechanism available for measuring the
performance of RL qua RL given these trade-offs.
We could conceivably measure some legal institutions (for instance, asking
whether a system of constitutionalism is more or less established),95 but how
are we to measure RL more globally when various governance structures push
in different directions? To make the point more concrete: Suppose we can say
that a developing country has an independent judiciary with a strong system of
judicial review and, for those reasons, is high on the RL “scale,” but it also has
a strong, unitary executive branch that, as best we can discern, does not
reliably respect decisions of the judiciary. How do we measure and promote
RL in that country? We need a sensible strategy for assessing trade-offs. And
this requires more than technical proficiency and sophistication; it requires
clarity about the concept of RL and a consensus about how and why we value
RL.
Moving from critique to constructive engagement with the RL enterprise,
we end by asking: “What sort of steps should we to follow to make
measurement possible?” Building on the list of difficulties and dilemmas
described at the beginning of this Part, we first suggest that efforts to measure
RL incorporate a similarly complex assessment of the political circumstances
of the system that measuring tool is assessing. Second, the way to incorporate
trade-offs into measurement efforts begins with a specification of how
different RL values are to be ranked. Some governance analyses triage RL
structures in certain ways; but we still lack the sort of comprehensive, ordinalor cardinal-ranking systems that would make measurement more fine-grained
and truer to the overall normative objectives of RL reformism. Third, greater
progress needs to be made in yoking RL structures to issues of capacity and
compliance. In short, we need to know how officials and branches of
government follow the rules and principles laid down by legal institutions.
This issue of compliance measurement is, of course, an analytically complex
one, and we simply note its importance in RL reform efforts. Lastly, and
perhaps most grandly, we call for greater engagement among social scientists,
legal scholars, and the RL reform community to refine the concept of RL, with
the goal of drawing upon the different perspectives available from these other
95 See, e.g., ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE
(describing constitutive elements of “constitutional order”).

OF
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disciplines and directions and generating a clearer strategy for assessment and
measurement.
III. CONSTRUCTING THE RULE OF LAW
There is broad consistency across the range of RL thinkers and activists
about what a legal system needs to have in place to implement RL. In addition
to basic agreement about what RL means and what qualities it entails, RL
requires of series of essential institutions. Likewise, RL requires key
governance structures—structures that, while perhaps different in architecture,
are elements in the basic RL edifice. Such investigation will help us frame our
discussion in Part IV about how we can (or cannot) implement RL given
certain assumptions about the structures of government within the United
States and abroad.
One key RL institution is the presence of a constitution—or, more
accurately, a scheme of constitutionalism.96 The idea here is a complex yet
familiar one: Only insofar as a polity has a body of (preferably written)
fundamental law embedded in a constitution can we plausibly measure the
government’s fidelity to the rule of law.97 The constitution’s service to RL is
two-fold. First, it provides the basic structure and rules of the system,
“stipulates institutions of government,”98 and tells the government (sometimes
in broad terms, other times more specifically) how to undertake its
responsibilities—that is, how to govern. Even more basically, it defines the
architecture of government by, for example, describing the structure of
lawmaking and law executing.99
Second, a constitution contains the
substantive rules that authorize and limit government regulatory power.100
96 See, e.g., Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
323 (1985).
97 See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001);
STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS & CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995); CHARLES H.
MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN (rev. ed. 1947); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING
DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001).
98 Russell Hardin, Constitutionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 289, 302
(Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006).
99 For an interesting perspective on the role of constitutions “as expressive documents,” see Geoffrey
Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Constitutions as Expressive Documents, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 98,
at 329, 340 (“But there is some danger . . . in asking a written constitution to perform the function of fully
defining the rules of the sociopolitical-economic game.”).
100 See, e.g., DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 17 (2006) (“Power is also limited
through specific prohibitions on decision outcomes reached by those in power.”). This idea that constitutions
can act as a limit on governmental authority was especially prominent in the work of David Hume and, later,
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When we say that a constitution describes the fundamental law, we are
referring to the rules explaining just how far the government can go. The
fundamental law, therefore, can be used to measure the metes and bounds of
the government’s regulatory authority. While most RL accounts are reticent to
offer big judgments about the content of this fundamental law, they are
considerably bolder in insisting that a constitution is a necessary condition for
a polity to be governed by RL.
Though deemed necessary, a written constitution is hardly a sufficient
condition for RL to flourish. Most constitutions have a rather short shelf-life,
approximately seventeen years on average.101 Moreover, the lion’s share of
new constitutions fail in the sense that political officials frequently disregard
their constitution, no matter how ideally it is written. Hence there is an
important mismatch between the establishment of a scheme of
constitutionalism in a country that ostensibly aims to establish RL and the
maintenance and performance of that constitution in the real world of law and
politics. Therefore, the agenda of establishing constitutionalism as a linchpin
of RL reform—an agenda reflected in much of the RL literature in both law
and political science—does not adequately come to terms with the law-onpaper and law-in-society incongruity.102
Rule-of-law reformers and theorists typically insist that there be a system
of judicial review available in countries that aim to establish RL.103 This
system enables a duly authorized institution—the judiciary—to assess and
make a binding judgment about whether and to what extent a government
action complies with the procedural and substantive requirements embodied in

Montesquieu and Madison. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (Sir Lewis A. Selby-Bigge &
Peter H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978) (1739–1740). See generally Hardin, supra note 98, at 306–07; Barry R.
Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic Stability in America’s First
Century (June 30, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1153527.
101 See Tom Ginsburg et al., The Lifespan of Written Constitutions, RECORD ONLINE, Spring 2009,
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/lifespan (“Constitutions, in general, do not last
very long.”).
102 For important exceptions to this phenomenon, see Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutional Stability, 3
CONST. POL. ECON. 137, 138–39 (1992); Weingast, supra note 100, at 2–5; Weingast, The Political
Foundations of Democracy, supra note 72, at 245–46.
103 See HAYEK, THE POLITICAL IDEAL OF THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 45; RAWLS, supra note 7, at
201; RAZ, supra note 63, at 216–17; Fallon, supra note 14, at 9 n.33 (“In the American context . . . the
association of the Rule of Law with judicial review is very strong.”); accord Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); Gerald F. Gaus, Public Reason and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra
note 5, at 328–29.
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the relevant constitution and other authoritative sources of law.104 One of the
consistent core ideas in the developed case for judicial review is that such an
institutional arrangement is necessary (or at least extremely important) to
maintaining a disinterested eye on the conduct and activities of government.105
Judicial review helps implement the rules and values of the constitution;
therefore, it helps implement the rule of law.
Related to this idea in important ways is the concept of the separation of
powers.106 Influential political theorists, not the least of whom include the
intellectual architects of the British and American constitutions,107 have
accounted for the division of powers and responsibilities among various
institutions (in the conventional schema, the legislature, the executive, and the
judiciary) on the ground that such a division safeguards RL.108 It does so
principally by managing the tactical aspects of multidimensional governance109
and, more to the point, by making it more difficult for any one set of
government officials to accumulate and aggrandize power.110 Separation of
powers shares in common with judicial review the idea that certain institutional
arrangements help implement RL by making it more likely that the good
governance qualities associated with the concept (recall here Fuller’s criteria

104 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 63, at 217 (noting that, as part of RL, “[t]he courts should have review
powers over the implementation of the other principles” (emphasis omitted)). But see Fallon, supra note 14, at
9 n.33 (“The necessary judicial role need not, at least on all theories, encompass review of legislative acts for
consistency with a written constitution; the demand is only for the availability of courts to apply ordinary
law.”).
105 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1699–
1703 (2008).
106 See generally W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1965); M.J.C. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967). On the connection between separation of
powers and the rule of law, see, for example, John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 58–70 (2001).
107 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–48, 51 (James Madison); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS
(Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
108 See, e.g., Lovett, supra note 14, at 66 (“One idea behind the separation of powers system, for example,
was precisely that since only power can effectively oppose power, we must cleverly design institutions such
that the battle lines drawn between competing powers happen to coincide with boundaries set by the Rule of
Law.”); Manning, supra note 106, at 58 (“[T]he full historical context suggests that the separation of the
legislative and judicial powers in the United States was designed, in part, to limit governmental discretion and
promote rule of law values.”).
109 See, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002); Cox &
McCubbins, supra note 17.
110 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“This policy of supplying,
by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of
human affairs, private as well as public.”).
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for successful law) will emerge from the complicated interplay of forces,
interests, expertise, and strategies.111 Ambition, wrote Madison, must be
counteracted by ambition, and the separation of powers represents the best
example of the sort of “auxiliary precautions” that he eloquently insisted upon
in the Federalist No. 51.112
A fourth institutional structure that is viewed in much of the literature as a
critical component of a system that values and safeguards RL is an
independent judiciary.113 While there are many different ways to capture
coherently the notion of judicial independence,114 structural insulation from
political pressure is the usual requirement.115 A 2008 USAID document
entitled Guide to Rule of Law Country Analysis, seeks to determine the level of
judicial independence by asking two questions: “Do the constitution and laws
of the country provide that the judiciary is an independent branch of
government? Do the laws relating to the structure and operations of the
judiciary place the principal control over most judicial operations in the hands
of the judiciary itself?”116 The first question ties the independent judiciary
directly back to the separation of powers,117 while the second question looks at
the degree of external political influence.
111 See, e.g., La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, supra note 33, at 446; Adam Przeworski, Why
Do Political Parties Obey Results of Elections?, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 114;
Barry R. Weingast, A Postscript to “Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” in
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 109.
112 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions.”); see also Manning, supra note 106, at 61 (“[The] rule-of-law justification for the
separation of powers owes a great deal to the Founders’ negative experiences with the ineffectively separated
powers of colonial and state governments.”).
113 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 106, at 66 (“[A] recurring theme was that judicial independence
furthered the related constitutional objectives of constraining official discretion and promoting the rule of
law.”); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law, in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW 3, 12–13
(Gianluggi Palombella & Neil Walker eds., 2009).
114 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 63, at 216–17 (“Since the court’s judgment establishes conclusively what is
the law in the case before it, the litigants can be guided by law only if the judges apply the law correctly.”).
115 See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 45, 47 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry
Friedman eds., 2002) [hereinafter JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE] (“[A]n independent judge is not subject to the
‘power’ of another individual or institution.”).
116 USAID, GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS: THE RULE OF LAW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 38
(2008), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/ROL_
Strategic_Framework_Sept_08.pdf.
117 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 106, at 58 (“[T]he U.S. Constitution takes pains to ensure judicial
independence from the control and functions of the political branches.”).
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Why do we value judicial independence? Among the various values
vouchsafed by judicial independence, two stand out: freedom from external
influence and judicial impartiality. Judicial independence may also be a proxy
for other values. For example, it may reflect “a concern about consistency
across cases and, hence, across time.”118 Both of these values are, of course,
RL values as traditionally understood. A fuller consideration of the connection
between judicial independence and RL must await the next Part,119 but the
central point here is that an independent judiciary is considered by many
commentators, and most RL reformers, as a sine qua non for RL. Indeed,
various indexes of RL found in USAID and World Bank reform efforts view
the relationship between judicial independence and good governance as a
linear one.120
Each of these “essential” institutions is usually evaluated by reference to
American criteria. That is, the literature looks at how the American system
configures constitutionalism, judicial review, separation of powers, and
judicial independence and then projects these structures onto other countries.
As we will explain in more detail below, there are at least two fundamental
problems with such an approach. First, the understandings of what these
institutions mean and how they are constructed vary by country.
Constitutionalism means something different in New Zealand and Chile than it
does in the United States and the United Kingdom. The same is certainly true
for judicial review. And it is especially true of the last two elements
mentioned—separation of powers and the independent judiciary. Simply
exporting an American system of separation of powers to a country whose
political structure, history, and culture understands the relationship among
government institutions in a different way would be extraordinarily difficult.
Second, even supposing that we could transplant these essential institutions to
developed and developing countries, the performance of these institutions will
look quite different.

118

Kornhauser, supra note 115, at 51.
See infra text accompanying notes 120–181.
120 See generally Robert J. Barro, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in GOVERNING FOR PROSPERITY 209
(Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Hilton L. Root eds., 2000). But see Charles M. Cameron, Judicial
Independence: How Can You Tell It When You See It? And, Who Cares?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra
note 115, at 143 (discussing studies that find “no impact of judicial independence on rule of law values”).
119
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IV. IMPLEMENTING THE RULE OF LAW
Much of the discussion up to this point has involved RL as an abstract
concept. In earlier Parts, we interrogated the basic principles and values of RL
and further considered how RL criteria map onto competing theories of law.
We also sketched some aspects of the institutional and structural apparatus of
RL in the reform project, noting that the construction of RL is viewed as
including certain essential institutions and key governance structures. We are
now ready to return to the central objective of this Article—a consideration of
how a deeper understanding of the nature and contents of RL will or should
impact the implementation of RL on the ground. Our investigation of
institutions and governance structures is necessarily preliminary. We are
interested here in revealing some of the underappreciated difficulties faced by
RL proponents in designing and maintaining various institutions. Some of
these difficulties are fundamental, while others are surmountable. In any
event, a closer look at the contingent and complex qualities of these legal
institutions and structures, as well as a closer look at trade-offs, will help aid
RL analysis and, more to the point, help improve the likelihood that RL efforts
in the real world will accomplish their objectives.
A. Judicial Independence and Judicial Performance
The RL literature does not make clear in its description of judicial
independence precisely from what judges are expected to be independent.121
Different conceptions of proper judging yield different answers. One modality
of judicial independence stresses freedom from the reality or appearance of
judicial corruption. Here, the defining element of judicial independence is
fidelity to law and legal principle regardless of where this fidelity leads the
judge. A judge betrays this fidelity, and thus the public trust, when he or she
pursues other objectives. These can be self-regarding or in service of the
objectives of other individuals or institutions with influence over the judge.122

121 On the puzzling nature of judicial independence, see, for example, McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial
Independence, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105, 105–06 (2006) (explaining that there is much disagreement
about what it means for a judiciary to be independent); see also Lydia Brashear Tiede, Judicial Independence:
Often Cited, Rarely Understood, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129 (2006).
122 In Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266–67 (2009), for example, the Supreme Court
decried the manner by which interest groups in West Virginia were able to make substantial financial
contributions to judges running for election in that state, thus raising questions about the judges’ fidelity to
legal principles.
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However, corruption is only one concern undergirding the case for an
independent judiciary. Another very different take on judicial independence
stresses the value and virtue of judicial impartiality. The idea is that judges
should come to legal disputes with an open mind; their judgments should be
influenced solely by the merits of the arguments, gleaned through (in the
American context) the arguments of the disputants or (in the civil law
tradition) by the judge’s own investigation and inquiry. Whatever threatens
impartiality threatens sound adjudication. Judges, in this conception, should be
kept independent from all realistic threats to this ideal of impartiality.
Requirements, for example, that prosecutors be independent (a requirement
that has been separately associated with RL),123 and prohibitions against judges
assessing evidence outside the purview of one of the parties, all contribute in
small or large ways to the ideal of judicial impartiality.124
Political influence is a significant threat to judicial impartiality. Members
of the executive or legislative branches frequently undertake to influence
judges in the outcome of specific cases, directly threatening the ability of
judges to render impartial judgment. Examples of external political threats to
judicial impartiality are legion. King James’s firing of Chief Justice Coke in
early seventeenth-century England,125 the effort by President Franklin
Roosevelt to pack the Supreme Court in the 1930s,126 and the recent effort on
the part of federal legislators to threaten judges who cite foreign law in their
opinions with impeachment127 all reveal that the threats to judicial impartiality
are ubiquitous. Judicial independence is regarded as a structural mechanism to
123 See RAZ, supra note 63, at 218 (stating that the prosecution should not have the discretion to decide
not to prosecute crimes committed by certain classes of offenders); About the ABA Rule of Law Initiative,
supra note 26.
124 In the administrative adjudication context, this ideal of impartiality is embedded in various provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act that seek to shield administrative law judges from threats to their
impartiality.
See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (2006)
(“[The agency adjudicator] . . . may not consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and
opportunity for all parties to participate . . . .”); id. § 554(d)(2) (“[An] employee or agent engaged in the
performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not . . . participate or advise
in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review . . . .”); id. § 557(d)(1)(A)–(C) (describing rules
against ex parte contacts in administrative adjudications).
125 See generally John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Rule of Democracy and Rule of Law, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 244–45 (describing the King James episode).
126 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995).
127 See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 637, 638–39 (“Congress has attempted to enact sweeping laws barring judges from using
foreign sources, while some senators have suggested that citation to a foreign source should be an impeachable
offense.”).
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insulate judges from external influence. And the influence that is most
worrisome is the kind of influence that would encourage a judge to decide an
issue on the basis of non-objective criteria—in short, to rule on the basis of
“men,” not “law.”
Another aspect of impartiality deserves mention. Until now, we have
focused on concerns about external influence. The underlying assumption is
that, but for this external influence, judges would come to disputes impartially
and utterly open-minded. An entirely separate threat to impartiality, however,
is the threat posed by the judge who is driven by internal influences that bias
his or her judgment and are wholly irrespective of external pressures. If judges
are ideological, the ideal of impartiality is deeply threatened.128 Ideologically
driven decision making steers the judge away from the arguments of the parties
and toward his or her ideology.129 If the decision is be compelled by the latter
rather than the former, it is a serious problem insofar as we prize judicial
impartiality above all else.
Notice here how judicial independence works in favor of the first
conception of impartiality but not necessarily in favor of the second. With
independence comes freedom from external influence. With no vulnerability
to reprisal, the judge is free to decide the case on the merits, and he may
adjudicate without regard to the views of legislators, governors, or presidents.
Judges are, in essence, empowered to govern on the basis of law, not men.
However, true judicial independence also gives judges license to decide on the
basis of their own ideological predilections. No opportunities exist for external
officials, be they legislators or chief executives, to check judicial freedom to
impose their own conceptions of justice, fair play, etc. If we suppose that
judges typically act this way, then judicial independence works against RL.
Such independence makes it more, rather than less, likely that judges will be
governed by men, not law.130
128 Cf. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else
Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993) (analyzing judges’ behavior using economic criteria and hypothesizing
that judges have preferences not unlike other public officials and, indeed, other members of the general
public).
129 See, e.g., DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1976);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); Jeffrey
A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 557 (1989). For a survey, see McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law: Decision Making by
Judiciary, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
1651 (Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
130 Judith Resnik and others note that this sense of partisanship may cut in the opposite direction; that is,
we may view it as perfectly acceptable for citizens, through their elected officials, to seek to entrench their
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This stylized conception of judicial decision making is not intended to take
any position on how judges behave. This is a very complex question addressed
within a large social science literature.131 Rather, our central point is that
judicial independence standing alone tells us little about whether and to what
extent RL is subserved unless we have a fuller idea of the risks associated with
varying degrees of judicial freedom. Under one conception of judicial
behavior, RL would be greatly aided by carefully structured judicial
independence, while under another conception, RL would be undermined by
this very same structure.132 Framing judicial independence in these two
different ways illustrates the multidimensionality of this one RL element. If
corruption is the principal worry, then RL demands especially rigorous ethical
standards and requirements of transparency to boot.133 We want to be crystal
clear about what interests may be implicated by one or another judicial
structure.134
We want public-regarding, not private-regarding judicial
decisions.135 If, instead, we worry principally about judicial partiality, then we
may or may not want judicial independence, depending where the threats to
impartiality arise.136
An additional wrinkle in the consideration of judicial independence as a
scheme for implementing RL is the issue of judicial philosophy. In a
contribution to a recent anthology on judicial independence, Lewis Kornhauser
own governance philosophies by influencing the judicial process. Given the permanence of judicial tenure,
the only credible way to influence the judicial process in an independence regime is by careful attention to, and
oversight of, the nomination and confirmation process. See Judith Resnik, Interdependent Federal
Judiciaries: Puzzling About Why & How to Value the Independence of Which Judges, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at
28, 32; see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006).
131 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008); ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 129; SEGAL
& SPAETH, supra note 129.
132 Cf. F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 712, 712–13 (2004) (explaining the trade-offs between different levels of judicial independence using a
model of strategic institutional choice).
133 See generally supra text accompanying notes 26–28 (discussion of the ABA Rule of Law Initiative).
134 See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
135 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
136 The assumptions and values concerning judicial performance are multifaceted, which explains in part
why judicial independence is not monolithic within the American judicial system. Quite simply, judges at
different levels will raise different sorts of risks and, correspondingly, will have different versions of
independence regimes applied to them. See Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial
Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 115, at 9, 16–22. The same point can be made about
judicial systems in other countries.

MCRODGAST GALLEYSFINAL

1484

10/8/2010 11:11 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

makes the wise point that judicial independence is seldom valued for its own
sake.137 What we really want to know, in assessing the connection between
judicial performance and RL (and other values), is the judge’s normative
theory of adjudication.138 Does the judge—or, if you prefer the bird’s eye
view, the judiciary—pay adequate fidelity to enacted law?139 Does the judge
follow precedent?140 Does the judge act assiduously, and on his own initiative,
to protect and promote the rule of law? If the answer to this is yes, then we
might well consider judicial independence as less essential to RL. If, instead,
judges aggrandize to themselves the lawmaking power, thereby replacing RL
values of consistency and (to bring in one of Joseph Raz’s requirements) the
value of legislative lawmaking with judicial fiat,141 then we might worry that
judicial independence provides judges with an unacceptably wide domain of
discretion. In such a system, we may prefer a non-independent judiciary, that
is, a judiciary under the influence and even control of the legislative and
executive branches—or, as with the elected judiciary in the American states,
the direct control of the voters. For it is only where these mechanisms are in
place that judges will be obedient to RL.142
In the end, we may be more interested in the central question of judicial
fidelity to law than how independent judges are from external influences.
Consider here the enduring question of judicial lawmaking. The prerogatives
given to judges to decide issues without the fear of individual reprisal would
appear to increase the incentives for judges to engage in more ambitious
lawmaking. In his comparative analysis of adjudication and courts, Martin
137

Kornhauser, supra note 118, at 45.
Id. at 53–54.
139 See, e.g., CASS, supra note 44, at 4–6.
140 See, e.g., Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmussen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The
Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997).
141 See Raz, supra note 71, at 357–58.
142 The observations here are primarily normative, raising questions about how we ought to view the
merits and demerits of judicial independence given what we know or think we know about judging. The
positive political theory (PPT) analysis of judicial independence is nested more rigorously in the “new
separation of powers literature” and emphasizes the ways in which judges, whether viewed as “independent”
or not, are embedded in a strategic political process that exerts influence and pressure over their decision
making. See Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. et al., The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 98, at 199, 208 (“The new separation-of-powers analysis treats
judicial decisions not as one-shot cases determined by their idiosyncratic characteristics, but as repeated
iterations of interactions between the branches.”). While the strategic model of judicial, legislative, and
executive decision making is not front and center in the analysis here, we do note that, with the benefit of PPT,
we can view more skeptically—or perhaps realistically—the claims that judges are in fact independent in their
decision making. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2002).
138
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Shapiro makes the point that “lawmaking and judicial independence are
fundamentally incompatible.”143 No political regime will permit, on any
sustained basis, judges to engage in interpretations that are far apart from the
will of the “governing coalition.”144 A common theme in the political science
literature is that courts, even while exercising discretion, will perform their
tasks within the broad strictures of an “interpretive regime” and will thus be
limited in their opportunities for lawmaking.145 This is a common theme and
one that resonates across a realm of methodological approaches and positive
analyses of judges and interactions among the judicial legislative and executive
branches.146 However, the normative proposition that judicial independence
and judicial lawmaking are incompatible is not free from controversy. Kim
Lane Scheppele, for example, insists that judges exercise wide discretion and,
indeed, seek substantive justice even in the face of positive law precisely
because judicial independence fosters these opportunities and duties.147
Scheppele writes: “If judges have to take a positivist attitude toward law and
simply follow the rules laid down by the political branches, then they are not
really independent of politics but . . . completely subservient to it.”148 In this
framework, judicial independence is not inconsistent with judicial lawmaking;
rather, judicial lawmaking is a necessary condition for judicial independence to
properly function.149
To summarize the insight of this section, the case for judicial independence
rests on a series of incomplete and, in some ways, controversial premises and
assumptions. The discussions of judicial independence with respect to indexes
of RL are often unclear about precisely what is meant by the term. Further,
circumstances arise in which judicial independence may not, in fact, serve the
objectives of RL reformers. We need not conclude, cynically, that judicial
independence is wholly chimerical and of little pertinence to RL reformism.
Instead, we address some of the problems with judicial independence as an
143

MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 34 (1981).
See id.
145 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law, in RULE
OF LAW, supra note 5, at 265, 265–67 (describing “interpretive regimes” as “systems of norms or conventions
that regulate the interpretation of legal materials, including statutes” (emphasis omitted)).
146 See de Figuerido, Jr. et al., supra note 142, at 199–201.
147 Kim Lane Scheppele, Declarations of Independence: Judicial Reactions to Political Pressure, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 136, at 227, 269.
148 Id. at 269.
149 See id. at 270 (“At its highest reaches, then, the independence of judges requires some legal and
institutional mechanisms through which the political branches can actually be challenged in their ability to
dictate to judges the entirety of the law they are to apply.”).
144
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analytical construct and as a normative principle in order to improve future
work on judicial performance, the judiciary as an institution, and the
relationship between certain theories of judging and RL values.
B. The Unitary Executive and Separation of Powers
A key tension arises between the virtue of the unitary executive as an
institutional mechanism for promoting RL and the virtue of promoting the
separation of powers for that same purpose. We consider that tension here—
not to resolve the dispute over the desirability of the unitary executive model,
but to once again illustrate the point that the successful implementation of RL
requires attention to these institutional complexities and to potential trade-offs
between competing structures and values.
Proponents of the unitary executive model in the United States,150 perhaps
channeling Alexander Hamilton and other intellectual architects of the strong
executive,151 emphasize that RL is best protected where the administration of
policy is managed by a strong executive in which there is a clear hierarchy.152
But this presupposes that those higher up the chain of command are interested
in following the law. Where, instead, they privilege their own interests above
fidelity to law, the unitary executive empowers the chief executive while also
enhancing executive power vis-à-vis the other branches. Insofar as this is a
risk, separation of powers is more important to the preservation of RL because
such a scheme enables institutions and officials outside the executive branch to
rein in executive authority. However, if this risk is minimal, and instead the
unitary executive better protects RL values, then separation of powers may
impede rather than facilitate RL.
How can we best evaluate these competing claims? To begin with, we
need a clear definition of the unitary executive. Such a definition remains
somewhat elusive.153 Formalistically, the unitary executive refers to a
structure in which all decision makers exercising executive power are located
150 See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008); Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power,
2003 ILL. L. REV. 701.
151 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“Energy in the
Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.”). See generally HARVEY C.
MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER (1989).
152 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
(1993) (making an extended argument for centralization of the Executive in order to improve administrative
performance).
153 See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS (4th ed. rev. 1957).
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within the executive branch and are under the authority of the chief
executive.154 However, there is less here than meets the eye. The Supreme
Court has been bedeviled by the question of what constitutes an executive
function. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,155 for example, the Court
assembled a vocabulary that distinguished executive from quasi-executive (and
legislative from quasi-legislative) functions in order to preserve a sphere of
congressional influence over administrative agencies—in that case, the Federal
Trade Commission—exercising a combination of powers and performing
diverse functions.156 Whatever its plausibility as a theoretical or structural
matter, this distinction has survived the test of time.157 Indeed, in the state
constitutional context, the reference to “quasi” powers—by which we mean
powers that are not cabined by the labels executive, legislative, or judicial—
has enabled courts to embrace (to a greater or lesser degree) the exercise of
multifaceted powers within the structure of a rigid, and typically textually
grounded, scheme of separation of powers.158
Suppose, instead, we take a more pragmatic route to the unitary executive
matter and view this ideal as entailing strong presidential or gubernatorial
control over the administration of the laws.159 This is the view reflected in
much of the regulatory policy-making literature and is one that looks past
originalist depictions of executive performance and the separation of powers;
instead, it explains how a workable, modern conception of regulatory policy
making in the post-New Deal administrative state requires the nesting of public
administration in a hierarchical conception of accountability and control.160
Such a model—one that we will consider at least a cousin to the classic model
of the unitary executive—can be grounded in a political idea of the chief
executive as principally responsive to public opinion161 or it can be grounded
in a sort of “scientific management” perspective162 one that views the chief

154

See Prakash, supra note 150, 772–74.
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
156 Id. at 622–28.
157 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
158 See Thomas R. Dye, Executive Power and Public Policy in the States, 22 W. POL. Q. 926 (1969).
159 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
160 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
161 See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). But see Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107
MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008) (opposing the position that centralized executive control responds adequately to voter
preferences).
162 See F.W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911).
155
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executive as a superior manager of regulatory decision making. Either way,
the unitary executive functions here in strongly practical terms. Definitionally,
then, we can see the unitary executive as a structure in which the
administration of policy is managed through a mainly top-down process, with
some shielding from influences and pressures of other branches in
government.163
With this definition in mind, let us consider how this unitary executive is
connected to RL. From one perspective, the accountability of low- and midlevel administrators to superiors within the executive branch line of authority
helps to ensure that government decisions are consistent and stable.164 More
generally, they can reassure us that the governors, in this case the bureaucrats,
are governed by law and that discretion is properly limited.165 Taken thusly,
we can see the unitary executive as a facilitator of RL values—indeed, we
want executive functions organized in a more, rather than less, unitary way
whenever possible. For it is through the device of top-down supervision,
nested in the constitutional requirement that the President “[t]ake care that the
[l]aws be faithfully executed,”166 that we can assure the maintenance of RL
against external pressures of infidelity.
Competing perspectives are possible, however.167 For instance, congruence
is, as Fuller noted, one of the values of RL.168 This means that there should be
a close connection between stated rules and implementation of those rules.
The structure of the unitary executive can potentially cordon off administrative
officials from checks by the legislative branch. Presumably, the legislative
branch will be the institution that has the most at stake—that is, the most to
gain and to lose—in ensuring that the rules promulgated by statute will be
implemented by executive officials along the lines delineated by the
legislature. Therefore, a focus on congruence as a key RL value may well
entail a focus on the incentives of an autonomous executive branch to depart

163 See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1260 (2006) (describing the nuts and bolts of regulatory oversight in the Executive Branch); see also
Kagan, supra note 159.
164 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 150, at 311; Mashaw, supra note 161, 96.
165 See, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
166 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
167 See, e.g., Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385
(2008); Abner Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123
(1994).
168 See FULLER, supra note 11, at 81–91.
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from promulgated rules and the capacity of the legislature to hold executive
officials in check.169
An even more serious critique is possible. Thus far, we have been
considering the unitary executive primarily in the American context. As we
explored earlier, the effort to transplant American-style legal institutions is
fraught with difficulties. In other countries in which official indiscretion is the
norm, not the exception, a strict hierarchy of control will frequently undermine
rather than subserve RL. What if control over the bureaucracy is in service of
arbitrary ends, such as “erasing” perceived enemies in the middle of the night?
Again, we cannot learn how legal institutions, such as the unitary executive,
succeed or fail until we have a better sense of how these institutions are
deployed in systems with different political contexts. Insofar as we say that
the unitary executive—or separation of powers more generally—“succeeds” in
the American context, why precisely does it succeed? What about the
American political and legal context contributes to this success? And what are
the positive assumptions that must underlie any effort to translate this success
to a different context? Without satisfactory answers to these questions,
progress on exporting legal institutions will be limited.
C. Constitutionalism’s Content
We can summarize the contingent value of the unitary executive thusly:
The value of this schema depends, first, upon the relationship between the
unitary executive and separation of powers more generally; next, upon a
positive political theory of government (not only in the United States, but also
abroad) and, in particular, positive theories of executive officials’ behavior and
performance; and, lastly, upon the objectives that the unitary executive system
is designed to achieve. The unitary executive also depends on RL, but for
reasons we have already described, that is an unsatisfactory answer. We need
both a theory of law and also a clear sense of what we want our executive
officials to facilitate and to achieve. This requires that we go beyond the RL
shibboleth and consider more comprehensively what aims we have in mind for
governing institutions in one or another political context.

169 We may say much the same about the judicial branch. The courts are also interested in ensuring that
their judgments are carried out by executive officials. However, lacking the power of the purse and the sword,
they must not only rely on executive fidelity, but may also have the resources available through the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers to keep the executive honest in the appropriate cases. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 391–97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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A further illustration of this very same point arises in connection with one
of the sacred cows of RL discourse, constitutionalism.170 The question
whether and to what extent constitutionalism is essential for RL purposes
arises precisely because the underlying purposes and functions of
constitutionalism are contingent upon larger questions about the behavior of
government and the political theory of the republic to which the constitution is
attached. This answer will likely be different in, say, Brazil and India than it
will be in the United States and Canada. Constitutions articulate not only the
appropriate procedures of governance,171 but also the bedrock of legal
principles from which governmental action and the lines between public
authority and private liberty are drawn.172 Does it follow that constitutionalism
by its very nature safeguards RL?
Clearly not. First, many constitutions around the world contain important
“exceptions” clauses—provisions that authorize certain governmental action
notwithstanding express prohibitions within the document.173 Furthermore,
government officials are typically authorized under these “exceptions” to make
the decision whether and to what extent to act. Executive decisions that would
be anathema in the American context, such as military coups or suspensions of
protections for criminal defendants, are common in, for example, Latin
American contexts even where written constitutions contain broad individual
rights provisions.174 That there are frequent examples of conflicts between
what the constitution forbids on the one hand and what it permits through
exceptions clauses on the other indicates that there is nothing about the mere
existence of a constitution that ensures that RL will be protected and preserved.
Secondly, constitutions frequently authorize governments to undertake
action without an express grant of power, whether constitutional, statutory, or

170

See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
See Hardin, Constitutionalism, supra 98, at 301–02.
172 See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LAW & POLITICS (Keith
E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008).
173 See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 33(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (commonly known as the “notwithstanding clause”);
Charter of Human Rights & Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 31(1) (Austl.) (“Parliament may expressly
declare in an Act that that Act or a provision of that Act or another Act or a provision of another Act has effect
despite being incompatible with one or more of the human rights or despite anything else set out in this
Charter.”).
174 See Luis Kutner & Beverly May Carl, An International Writ of Habeas Corpus: Protection of Personal
Liberty in a World of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 22 U. PITT. L. REV. 469, 554 (1961).
171
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otherwise. The police power in the American state constitutional context,175
the “necessary and proper” clause in the American federal context,176 and
general welfare clauses in many other constitutional contexts177 are examples
of just this phenomenon. Such broad authority granted to the government is
justified largely on grounds of exigency.178 But notice how the presence of
governmental prerogative and the corresponding absence of limits are
inherently in tension with RL values. We might be quite willing to trade off
these values in order to realize the values of governmental flexibility, but we
should do so recognizing that RL has been sacrificed, or at least has been
shuffled down the deck of values. Lastly, even where there is a constitution in
operation, the problem remains (especially outside the United States) of how to
get political officials—executive leadership in particular—to adhere to the
constitution. Given ubiquitous incentives to defect from the constitutional
bargain, it is remarkable if not extraordinary to see government officials
following constitutional rules where strong forces pull in other directions.179
And where they do follow these rules, RL values are safeguarded not because
there is a constitution in place, but rather because of the complex political
structure and circumstances that yield compliance and reduce the risk of
violence and defection from the social contract.180
The RL literature dwells on the nature of constitutions as instruments of
fundamental law. It sees constitutions as the inevitable source of limits on
governmental power, as guidelines for governments to follow in pursuing

175

See generally ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

(1904).
176

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
See, e.g., Art. 75, § 18, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL (ARG.).
178 A contemporary controversy with regard to this broad authority and its tension with RL in the
American context is the controversial view that the President has the power to wage war and to carry out
cognate wartime responsibilities in a domestic context, for example, detention, interrogation, and surveillance.
See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE (2005). Such an idea, so the argument goes, grows
directly from the constitutional authority vested in the President, per Article II, to act as Commander in Chief.
Somewhat paradoxically, but not illogically, the argument rests squarely on the existence and authority of the
Constitution, while relying on the notion that the Constitution in no serious way limits the implied powers of
the President. This is not the place to debate the merits of this far-reaching argument; rather, this example
illustrates the point that constitutionalism qua constitutionalism does not ensure that RL will be followed.
Constitutions (and, indeed, constitutional interpretations) can be more or less facilitative of RL.
179 See, e.g., Yadira Gonzalez de Lara et al., Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions,
98 AM. ECON. REV. 105 (2008); Weingast, supra note 100.
180 See Gonzalez de Lara, supra note 179, at 105–09; Weingast, supra note 100, at 10–15.
177
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authority.181 Moreover, these guidelines ideally limit the scope of judicial
initiative by guiding judges in resolving disputes. Written constitutions have a
special virtue in that they make these guidelines transparent and tractable,
thereby improving RL.182 However, we cannot embrace this view without
knowing more about the content of a constitution. The nexus between
constitutionalism and RL depends upon the formal and practical expression of
RL values in the constitution—in the document itself and, not unimportantly,
in the ways it is interpreted in real life. That a version of constitutionalism
may work at cross-purposes with RL stands as a brute fact supporting the idea
that this institutional mechanism has a contingent, rather than intrinsic,
relationship with RL.
CONCLUSION
While there is enormous enthusiasm about the rule of law worldwide, we
should be somewhat apprehensive about transplanting American-style legal
institutions into other countries and systems of government until we have a
clearer sense of the concept and can demonstrate a much more informed
understanding of how these institutions will work and how trade-offs will be
made when values, structures, and rules come into conflict.
The problems with the current state of the literature and reform projects are
several-fold. First, we lack a consensus regarding exactly why we value RL.
While a rich literature has grown around this question, we still need to zero in
on the normative reasons why particular elements of RL are valued (this is
important for, among other reasons, helping us make trade-offs when values
come into conflict). Second, too few satisfactory connections are made
between RL and theories of legal decision making. Rule-of-law values must
be grounded in a particular theory of law. For example, the implications for
RL reform will be different depending on whether one is a legal realist or a
legal formalist. For the rule of law to be a meaningful construct that can be
used prescriptively to build institutions in emerging democracies or to perform
the more mundane task of defining RL, scholars and practitioners must be
181 See LUTZ, supra note 100, at 23–24 (“Constitutional purposes are multiple, and liberty thus has several
layers; among various related institutional implications are rule of law, republicanism, and limited
government.”).
182 See id.; see also Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Constitutions as Expressive Documents, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 98, at 329, 332 (“[A] written constitution can embody the constitutional rules,
and indeed should do so. That is the conceived function of constitutional documents, and to the extent that
such documents do not specify the rules of the game that is seen to represent a ‘future.’”).
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upfront about the theory of law that underpins their views and expectations.183
Unpacking the commonly used measures of RL should make us think critically
about the construct of RL on which they are based. Rather than measuring RL,
these instruments often serve to measure the level of democratic values in a
society or the extent to which it has implemented Western democratic
traditions and thought. Often, indices of RL capture both a classical view of
the law as being derived from nature or written by God and the influence of the
legal process school, which envisions RL as a system of processes based on
neutral principles. These two theories of law often do not and cannot fit into
the same construct of RL. Indeed, any instrument that measures RL will
require analysts to make trade-offs between, say, democracy, legal formalism,
and the legal process view.
Third, we need to have more clarity in the connection between RL in theory
and RL in implementation. This connection requires not only a careful
specification of RL qualities, but also a satisfactory positive analysis of
governmental performance to support the claim that RL necessitates one or
another institution. For example, our discussion of judicial independence
suggests that the imprecision in this concept raises questions about whether
and how RL is facilitated by judicial independence. Relatedly, we have to
have a clearer way to evaluate trade-offs when RL values come into conflict.
Circumstances arise in which we are making incommensurable comparisons
between values, interests, and objectives; there are even circumstances in
which, at least in theory, cycling among preferences for competing institutional
arrangements is possible.
A separate, but equally fundamental, difficulty concerns the lack of an
adequate basis for evaluation and measurement. It is likely that no single
definition of RL will ever achieve consensus among those who make RL
promotion their central goal. Aggregating all of the existing measures into an
ordinal scale or index, which is the most common approach, does little to
overcome this definitional divide and only serves to violate every tenet of
measurement theory.184
Moreover, scholars and reformers too easily fall into the habit of equating
American governmental institutions with good legal institutions. When we
consider the relationship between separation of powers and RL, we usually
have in mind the American-style separation of powers. This is problematic,
183
184

See, e.g., Posner, supra note 128.
For an overview of RL instruments and empirical uses, see Haggard, supra note 9.
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insofar as the underlying political structure of countries to which the RL
reform project is directed may be—and frequently are—quite different than the
American structure. In addition to asking whether American-style RL is the
best template for reform in other nations, the transplanting of American
institutions to other contexts makes it very hard to evaluate progress. Where
one or another RL institution fails, we do not know whether this failure is the
result of a flawed view of RL generally or a mismatch between institution and
country.
Given the many needs and beliefs of a society, RL may come in many
flavors and include many dimensions. Citizens may prefer that the theory of
justice on which RL is based be tailored to a specific policy context and
change across different policies. While a law and economics view may be
preferable to some in the context of contract law, others may prefer to rely on
legal process to define the governing concept behind administrative law. Such
a patchwork of RL theories and institutions cannot simply be stitched together
and called the rule of law and exported to any country in any period of time.

